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a. Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and then failed to acknowledge 
existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law 24 
b. Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed HCA's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim and then failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry of the alleged "Answer" of Richards. 
26 
- 2 -
Flanders violated Rule 11 because she failed to make any reasonable 
inquiry of existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law in numerous memoranda when she wrongly 
asserted as fact and law that (1) a corporation has a duty to notify the State 
of Utah of changes in its officers and directors; (2) Utah Law allows service 
on a director; and (3) by definition a director is an officer and a managing 
agent 28 
1. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of existing 
law, that a corporation, including a dissolved corporation, has a duty to 
immediately notify the State of Utah of changes in its officers and 
directors, other than annually 28 
2. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of existing 
law, that Utah Law allows service on a director. 
30 
3. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of existing 
law, that by "definition, a director is an officer, a managing or general 
agent and is an agent of the corporation for purposes of service of 
process." 31 
Flanders violated Rule 11 when she stated as fact, in several memoranda to 
the court and in letters to Counsel for the Defendants that a Certificate of 
Finalization for Richards' deposition was in the court's file, and failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry of the court's file or docket 32 
Flanders violated Rule 11 many times by wrongly asserting that the court 
had made findings or determinations, and she failed to cite to the Record 
because the court had made no such findings or determinations 38 
1. Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court 
had determined that the Company was sufficiently served and that 
Richards was a proper agent to accept service for the Company. . . . 38 
2. Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court 
had determined that Don's Amended Answer and Counterclaim was 
frivolous or non-meritorious 39 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Rule 37 sanctions against the 
Plaintiff/Appellee and its attorney, Brenda L. Flanders ("Flanders"), without any finding 
that Flanders was "substantially justified" as required by Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P. 
Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness, although there are no cases precisely on point, see e.g., United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Society of 
Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Notice of Appeal on 
July 29, 1996. (R. 1752-53.) 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., 
sanctions against Flanders for repeatedly filing written memoranda relating to or in 
opposition to the Defendants'/Appellants' motion to dismiss without a reasonable inquiry 
of the facts or law and without any argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law. The trial court made no findings on this issue. The most logical 
inference from the trial court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions against Flanders is that the 
trial court found no violation of Rule 11. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See 
e.g., Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1233-35 (Utah 1992); Schoney v. Memorial 
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Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Rimensburger v. Rimensburger, 841 
P.2d 709, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 170 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) ("whether specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question 
of law") 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of a Notice of Appeal on 
July 29, 1996 (R. 1752-53.) 
3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendants/Appellants then-
costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P., when the Plaintiffs case was dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in the form of an Amended Notice of 
Appeal on January 3, 1997. (R. 1795-96.) 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated. § 78-27-56, U.C.A. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before 
the court; or 
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(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e) (pertinent part): 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a 
common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or 
general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive 
service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If 
no such officer or agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or 
advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the 
state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon 
the person in charge of such office or place of business;... 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 (pertinent part): 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney 
shall be signed by at least one attorney . . . . A party who is not represented by 
an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. 
. . . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that 
he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or 
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, 
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion 
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order 
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
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incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) (pertinent part): 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it 
is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33 (pertinent part): 
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve upon any other party 
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served . . . . 
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing . . . The 
answers are to be signed by the person making them . . . . The party upon 
whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers 
and objections, if any, within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories . . . 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37 (pertinent part): 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to 
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted 
under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory 
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may 
move for an order compelling an answer . . . . 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive 
or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
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(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall, after 
opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both 
of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust. 
(d) Failure of party to . . . serve answers to interrogatories or respond to request 
for inspection. If a party . . . fails . . . serve answers or objections to 
interrogatories . . . , the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are jus t , . . . In lieu of any order or 
in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney 
advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d) (pertinent part): 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either 
in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to 
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, 
other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, 
shall abide the final determination of the cause. . . . 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after 
the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are 
claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that 
the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. 
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service 
of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the 
court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The underlying action brought by the Plaintiff/Appellee, Hub Cap Annie, Inc., 
("HCA") was for breach of an alleged franchise agreement between HCA and 
Defendant/Appellant Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. ("Company"). HCA also included as 
defendants two individual incorporators of the Company, including the other appellant in 
this appeal, Don C. Jensen ("Don"). However, HCA's Complaint was eventually 
dismissed for insufficiency of service of process. None of the merits of HCA's causes of 
action were ever tried. Rather, the 2 years of proceedings consisted of a multitude of 
motions to dismiss HCA's Complaint and subsequently to impose sanctions against HCA 
and its attorney, Brenda L. Flanders ("Flanders"). 
The Company's basis for seeking dismissal of HCA's complaint was that no proper 
individual was served who could accept service for the Company. Nearly all of the 
proceedings were to determine this central issue: Was Troy Richards ("Richards"), a 
former employee and director of the Company, a proper person to accept service for the 
Company pursuant to Rule 4, Utah R. Civ. P. ? 
Course of Proceedings 
The trial court held only one hearing during the entire proceedings, despite dozens 
of requests by the Company and Don for such hearings. One hearing was also held at the 
Utah Supreme Court on a petition for extraordinary relief brought by the Company 
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because Judge Peuler, who was newly assigned to this case after Judge Frederick recused 
himself, would not review any of Judge Frederick's prior rulings in the case, including 
the Company's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court entered an order the same day 
vacating the part of Judge Peuler's minute entry which stated that she had no authority to 
review Judge Frederick's rulings. The first hearing in the trial court was then held, and 
HCA's Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for insufficiency of service of 
process. Amazingly, this issue was first brought to the attention of the trial court in June 
1995 in Don's Answer to HCA's Complaint. Nonetheless, it took from June 1995 until 
April 1996 before the trial court ruled on this issue and dismissed HCA's Complaint. 
Disposition 
The trial court (1) dismissed HCA's Complaint without prejudice, (2) denied the 
Company's request for Rule 11 and Rule 37 sanctions against HCA and Flanders, and (3) 
denied costs to the Defendants/Appellants. 
Relevant Facts 
1. HCA, a franchisor and a Nevada corporation, brought this action against the 
Company and Don on August 17, 1994. 
2. The Company, an alleged franchisee, filed its Articles of Dissolution on 
September 14, 1994, with Utah's Division of Corporations. Addendum L (R. 493.) 
3. Don was a director and an owner of the Company, and for all times since the 
filing of this action, he was the Company's only director and the only individual involved 
in any meaningful activity with the Company. (R. 490.) 
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4. In an attempt to comply with the service requirements of Rule 4, Utah R. Civ. P., 
HCA served Richards who at the time of service was a former employee/director of the 
Company. (R. 45-47.) In response to such service, Richards filed, without counsel, a 
one-page letter with the trial court. Addendum 2. (R. 485.) His unsigned letter clearly 
stated that he had left the Company approximately six weeks prior to the date on which 
he was served. Id. 
5. HCA eventually served Don 276 days after the commencement of this action. 
(R. 68.) 
6. HCA took the position that (1) Richards was a proper person to accept service for 
the Company; and (2) his unsigned letter on file with the trial court was the Company's 
official "Answer" to the Complaint. (R. 401, 410, 412.) Moreover, HCA tenaciously 
held to this position throughout the proceedings without any factual or legal authority. 
7. The Company and Don took the opposing and eventually correct position that 
(1) HCA failed to serve the Company because Richards was not a proper person to accept 
service for the Company, and (2) Richards' unsigned letter could not stand as the 
Company's "Answer." (R. 373-79.) 
8. On February 7, 1995, Flanders conducted a deposition of Richards with no other 
attorneys or parties present. (R. 402, 656.) Until early 1996, Flanders had the only copy 
of that deposition, although she quoted from it several times beginning in early 
November 1995 to support HCA's argument that Richards filed the Company's 
"Answer." (R. 400, 402, 408, 656.) 
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9. Throughout protracted proceedings from October 1995 to April 1996, consisting 
of scores of motions,1 HCA filed numerous memoranda which lacked any factual or legal 
authority on several material issues. Such actions unduly and unreasonably prolonged 
this litigation causing the company and Don to incur substantial legal expenses. 
10. For months during these proceedings, Flanders refused to provide to the 
Company's counsel, Michael A. Jensen ("Jensen"), the name of the court reporter who 
transcribed Richards' deposition, which Flanders conducted prior to service on the 
Company or Don. (R. 945-51.) The Company and Don finally filed a Motion to 
Compel, pursuant to Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P. (R. 967-68.) The trial court granted their 
motion but failed to grant sanctions against HCA or Flanders. (R. 1253-56, 1734-35.) 
The trial court also failed to make any findings that HCA and Flanders were 
"substantially justified" in refusing to provide the name of the court reporter who 
transcribed Richards' deposition, despite HCA's use of the deposition to support its 
insistence that Richards was a proper person to accept service for the Company. 
(R. 402, 408.) 
11. Without factual or legal authority, HCA and Flanders tenaciously held to then-
position that the Company was properly served and that the "letter" on file with the trial 
1
 These proceedings included a petition to Utah's Supreme Court for Extraordinary Relief 
when Judge Sandra N. Peuler refused to reconsider any of Judge Frederick's prior rulings, all without hearing, 
whom Judge Peuler had replaced in this action after Judge Frederick recused himself from this case. The 
Supreme Court entered an order the following day which clarified for Judge Peuler that she had the authority 
and duty to review any prior rulings by Judge Frederick. Judge Peuler then held the first hearing, except for 
the one with the Utah Supreme Court, in this action and considered the Company's Motion to Dismiss. 
Shortly thereafter, Judge Peuler dismissed HCA's Complaint for failure to serve a proper person. 
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court was properly the Company's "Answer." (R. 408-09.) Since HCA's position was 
not based on any legal foundation, the Company and Don filed their Motion for Rule 11 
sanctions against HCA and Flanders. 
12. The trial court signed a Final Order on July 1, 1996, in which it dismissed 
HCA's Complaint, denied the Company's and Don's Motion for Rule 11 sanctions 
against HCA and Flanders, and denied the Company's and Don's Motion for 
Reconsideration on their motion for Rule 37 sanctions against HCA and Flanders. 
Addendum 3. (R. 1734-35.) The trial court failed to make any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law on the issues relating to violations of Rules 11 or Rule 37, Utah R. 
Civ. P. See id 
13. Upon dismissal of HCA'a Complaint for failure to serve the Company, the 
Company and Don filed on July 8, 1996, their Verified Memorandum of Costs, pursuant 
to Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P., in the amount of $223.60. (R. 1737-38.) After further 
protracted proceedings and admitted errors by the trial court,2 an order was eventually 
entered denying costs to the Company and Don. Addendum 4. (R. 1791.) 
14. On January 3, 1997, the Company and Don timely filed their Amended Notice 
of Appeal.3 
2
 The trial court entered ambiguous and conflicting minute entries that required five months to 
correct; the trial court eventually admitted its mistakes. 
3
 The trial court failed to timely forward a copy of the Amended Notice of Appeal to the Court 
of Appeals. This was apparently accomplished only after counsel for the Company informed both the Court 
of Appeals and the Trial Court that no such action had been taken. Accordingly, the Docketing Statement 
does not include any mention of the appeal on the issue of costs. Also, that portion of the Record following 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Flanders refused to provide to Jensen the name of the court reporter who had 
transcribed Richards' deposition, which was conducted by Flanders at a time when no 
parties had been served and no attorneys were present. Richards' deposition was cited 
repeatedly by HCA to support its contention that Richards was a proper person to accept 
service for the Company. Although the trial court granted the Company's motion to 
compel and ordered Flanders to provide the name of the court reporter to Jensen so that 
he could obtain a copy of Richards' deposition, the trial court failed to impose any 
sanctions against HCA or Flanders as Rule 37 requires. Further, the trial court failed to 
find that HCA and Flanders were substantially justified in withholding the name of the 
court reporter or that an award of sanctions would be unjust. Therefore, the Company 
and Don brought their appeal and now contend that the trial court erred as a matter of law 
by not imposing sanctions against HCA and/or Flanders. 
II. Flanders violated Rule 11 numerous times in her pleadings filed with the trial 
court and also with the Utah Supreme Court.4 Flanders repeatedly made unfounded and 
erroneous assertions that (1) Utah law requires a corporation to immediately report any 
changes in its officers and directors to the Division of Corporations; (2) under Utah law, a 
corporation's officers and directors are in fact those officers and directors whose names 
the Record that was indexed by the trial court's clerk. 
4
 See footnote 1, supra. 
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appear on the most recent Annual Report on file with the Division of Corporations, 
notwithstanding that such officers or directors may have resigned or departed the 
corporation; (3) Utah law defines a director to be an officer for purposes of service of 
process; (4) Utah law permits service on a corporation by serving one of its directors; and 
(5) an unsigned letter from a former director of the Company could stand as the 
Company's official and legal "Answer" to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
None of Flanders' assertions were supported by citation or reference to statute, rule, 
case, or any other authority. Moreover, Flanders not once argued that existing law should 
be modified or extended. In effect, Flanders repeatedly failed to make any reasonable 
inquiry into the law or facts to support her material assertions and which assertions 
unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings in the trial court prior to the dismissal of the 
Plaintiffs Complaint for insufficiency of service of process. Despite the numerous 
violations of Rule 11, the trial court denied the Company's and Don's requests for 
sanctions, and the trial court also failed to articulate any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law on this issue. The Company and Don believe the trial court erred as a matter of law 
by not imposing sanctions against Flanders. 
III. Upon entry of the final order in this action, the Company and Don filed their 
Memorandum of Costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ, P. However, the trial court 
refused to tax any of the Defendants' costs against HCA and again failed to articulate any 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Rule 54(d) clearly grants cost* to the prevailing 
party. The Company and Don were clearly the prevailing parties. The Company and 
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Don believe that the trial court erred as a matter of law by not taxing HCA for their 
reasonably necessary costs. 
ARGUMENT 
L The trial court erred by not imposing sanctions against HCA and/or Flanders 
when the court granted the Company's and Don's Motion to Compel but failed 
to make any findings that HCA or Flanders was substantially justified in 
withholding the information sought or that sanctions would be unjust 
Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P., mandates the court to impose sanctions to the prevailing 
party unless the court finds that the non-prevailing party was substantially justified or that 
sanctions would be unjust: 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an 
order compelling discovery . . . 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall 
after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or 
both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred 
in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that 
the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(d) Failure of party to . . . serve answers to interrogatories or respond to 
request for inspection. If a party . . . fails . . . serve answers or objections 
to interrogatories . . . , the court in which the action is pending on motion 
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are j u s t . . . In lieu of 
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to 
act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that 
the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust. 
Rule ^7(a)(4) & (d), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
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The operative term "shall," in Rule 37(a)(4), requires the trial court to impose 
sanctions, unless the court finds that opposition to the motion was substantially justified 
or that sanctions would be unjust.5 Without making any findings that HCA's and 
Flanders' opposition to the Company's request were substantially justified or that 
sanctions would be unjust, the trial court must impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. 
Moreover, sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37(d) without any prior court order 
compelling HCA or Flanders to provide the information sought. See Schoney v. 
Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citingfrom C. Wright 
and A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2291, at 812-13, 817 (1970)); see 
also W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977). 
The intransigence of Flanders in this matter is inexcusable. In three letters, Jensen 
requested Flanders to provide the name of the court reporter who transcribed Richards' 
deposition. (R. 954-56.); Addendum 5 at 1-3. In her response, Flanders stated that: 
"you were told previously that Rocky Mountain Court Reporters prepared 
the transcript of the deposition of Richards." 
See Flanders Letter, dated January 10, 1996; Addendum 5 at 5. (R. 958.) 
Instead of berating Jensen, Flanders could have easily acknowledged her error and 
supplied the correct name of the reporter. Jensen's Letter, dated January 15, 1996, 
expressly called this issue to her attention: 
Further, there is no listing in the Salt Lake City telephone directory for a 
"Rocky Mountain Court Reporters." Please clarify and please respond 
5Rule 37 also requires the court to conduct a hearing, and the court also failed to meet this 
requirement. 
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with all the information that I have repeatedly requested: name, address, 
telephone number, and date of deposition. 
See Jensen Letter, dated January 15, 1996; Addendum 5 at 7. (R 960.) 
In reply, Flanders engaged in a tirade against Jensen and again offered information 
that proved to be in error: 
"On or about June 21, 1995, the court reporter filed with the Court a 
Certification of Finalization of the original deposition transcript of 
Tioy A. Richards." 
See Flanders Letter, dated January 18, 1996; Addendum 5 at 12. (R. 965.) 
No such document was ever listed in the Court's Docket for this case nor filed in the 
Court's Record in this action. Moreover, Flanders failed to provide the requested 
information. If the trial court had made findings on the issue of whether HCA and 
Flanders were substantially justified in withholding the information sought by the 
Company, the court could have reached no other rational conclusion than to find that 
HCA and Flanders were not substantially justified in withholding the information sought 
and no other circumstances existed to make an award to the Company unjust. 
The Company's and Don's requests to Flanders were made in a series of letters, and 
were not in the customary form for interrogatories or requests for the production of 
documents. See Addendum 5. Nonetheless, the requests were necessary and they 
focused on a single bit of information so that a copy of Richards' deposition could be 
obtained. Only after months of requesting this information was a motion to compel filed. 
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Flanders and HCA argue that since the letters were not in the traditional form for 
discovery pursuant to Rule 33, they do not fit within Rule 37 for sanctions. This is a 
technicality, or form over substance, that attempts to obscure the unreasonable conduct of 
Flanders. First, Rule 33 does not require any particular words, language or form in 
issuing requests for discovery.6 Second, Rule 37 imposes no special language or form 
requirements on the party seeking discovery. Third, Rule 37 plainly allows an award of 
expenses if "the motion is granted". Fourth, whatever technical problems that may have 
existed were mooted when the court accepted and granted the motion to compel without 
any comment on whether technical deficiencies existed. In effect, the court sanctioned 
the appropriateness of the Motion to Compel and ruled on it pursuant to Rule 37. 
II. The trial court erred by (1) not making any findings of fact or conclusions of law 
on the issue of whether HCA and/or Flanders violated Rule 11, and (2) not 
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Flanders for repeatedly violating Rule 11. 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., requires sanctions by using the term "shall" whenever the 
court finds that the an attorney violates Rule 11: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an 
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record . . . The signature of 
an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
6
 The relevant portion of Rule 33 is presented supra and the full text of the Rule is contained 
in Addendum 7. The Rule only refers to an interrogatory, which is a written question. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 819 (6th ed. 1990). 
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increase in the cost of litigation. . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
Rule 11 requires an attorney or party to make some inquiry into both the facts and 
the law before the paper is filed, and the level of inquiry is tested against a standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances. See Taylor v. Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 170 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (award of attorney fees was appropriate as a sanction for attorney's 
filing an invalid document with the Complaint because a reasonable inquiry would have 
disclosed that the document contained the signature of only one witness and was 
therefore invalid); see also Giffen v. R. W.L., 913 P.2d 761, 763-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(sanctions affirmed because the attorney made allegations that were not well grounded in 
fact and failed to make any reasonable inquiry into existing law). "This objective 
approach allows sanctions to be imposed in a greater range of circumstances than did the 
pre-amendment, subjective 'bad faith' approach." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 17. "Whether 
specific conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of law." Id. at 171. "If a 
Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated." Id; see also Barton v. 
Utah Transit Authority, 872 P.2d 1036, n. 6 (Utah 1994) ("once a court finds a violation, 
it must (1) impose sanctions and (2) be able to retain jurisdiction to enforce those 
sanctions") (emphasis added). 
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The Defendants request sanctions against Flanders because of many violations of 
Rule 11. Only five categories of violations are specifically detailed below, although 
within each category of violations, Flanders generally violated Rule 11 multiple times in 
various memoranda filed by her on HCA's behalf.7 
a. Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim and then failed to acknowledge 
existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law. 
Rule 15(a) governs amendments to pleadings, including Counterclaims. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at 
any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend 
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . . 
Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
The Rule clearly permits Don to amend his counterclaim once without leave of court "at 
any time before a responsive pleading is served." The only response HCA offered was a 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim. However, a Motion to Dismiss is not a "responsive 
pleading." See Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Don was entitled by right to amend his Counterclaim once without leave of court. 
7
 Most of Flanders' memoranda contain the same language, statement of facts, and arguments 
- often identical. 
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Therefore, HCA's Motion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim based on Rule 15(a) was 
filed without merit. 
In her Argument, Flanders asserted that a "Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim was 
a responsive pleading to the Answer and Counterclaim." PI.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to 
Strike, dated July 31, 1995 at 3 (R. 187.) Not only is her statement without any legal 
foundation, Flanders failed to cite any authority, except Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P., for her 
assertion. Flanders also failed to acknowledge or cite Heritage, although Heritage is 
expressly cited in the annotated section following Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P., under the 
heading of "Responsive pleading." (quotes in original). (R. 1650-52.) Flanders ignored 
Heritage and failed to offer any extension, modification, or reversal of the law which 
clearly holds that a "motion to dismiss" is not a responsive pleading. 
From the foregoing, Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry of the law. A 
mere reading of the annotations following Rule 15 would have revealed to Ms. Flanders 
that Don was perfectly within his rights to file an Amended Answer without leave of 
court. It is equally clear that Flanders failed to make an argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing the law. Hence, Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed HCA's 
Motion to Strike Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Ironically and incredibly, Flanders 
had the audacity to ask the court for her attorney's fees: 
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The Amended Answer and Counterclaim filed by Don must be 
stricken due to his failure to comply with Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and HCA should be granted its fees and costs for having to 
file the Motion to Dismiss and this Motion to Strike. 
PL 's Mem. in Supp. of Mot to Strike, dated July 31, 1995 at 4, (R. 188.) 
Since Flanders violated Rule 11, sanctions must be imposed against her. 
b. Flanders violated Rule 11 when she filed HCA's Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim and then failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry of the alleged "Answer" of Richards. 
Don's Response in Opposition to HCA's Motion to Dismiss correctly asserted that 
the Company had not filed an Answer to HCA's Complaint. See Def 's Mem. in Opp 'n., 
dated September 21, 1995, at 2, 10. (R. 318, 326.) Don's knowledge was based on the 
fact that he was the only active member of the Company, that he owned more than 80% 
of the Company, that he was the Registered Agent for the Company, and that on 
August 5, 1994, he personally fired Richards for embezzlement and other crimes. Id 
In HCA's Reply Memorandum, Flanders declared that Don's "allegation simply is 
false." See PL 's Reply, dated September 18, 1995 at 4, (R. 287.) However, a reasonable 
inquiry of the alleged "Answer'' would have revealed to Flanders that on its face and from 
Richards' own words, he left the Company more than six weeks prior to when HCA 
served him. Further, his letter is unsigned and must be stricken as a matter of law 
pursuant to Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P., unless Richards would "promptly" sign his 
"Answer." 
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Despite these facially obvious facts, Flanders boldly asserted that Don's Response 
to the "Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim is without merit and should 
be dismissed." See PI's Reply, dated September 18, 1995 at 5. (R. 288.) The alleged 
"Answer" is a one-page, unsigned letter from Richards. Addendum 2. More directly at 
issue, however, are Richards' own words that he had departed the Company: "I left Don 
and Utah Wheels on or about August 20, 1994 due to poor working conditions and his 
failure to pay wages." See Addendum 2. Richards was served on October 4, 1994 
(R. 45.) 
Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry into the validity of service on 
Richards. First, an attorney would reasonably understand that an unsigned pleading must 
be stricken pursuant to Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. Second, an attorney would also 
reasonably question the validity of HCA's service of process where the person served is 
initially thought to be an agent of the corporation but who, upon service, states in clear, 
unambiguous language that he left the corporation more than six weeks before he was 
served. See Addendum 2. Third, Richards was at most a director and never an officer of 
the Company (R. 1566.) Fourth, there is no statutory basis for serving a director. See 
Rule 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. There is also no rule or case law which permits service on a 
director or which supports Flanders' theory of the law. These four factors compel an 
attorney to seriously and reasonably question whether service of Richards was effective 
and proper service on the Company. Yet, Flanders defended beyond reason her assertion 
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that the Company was properly served when HCA served Richards six weeks after he 
admitted leaving the Company. 
At the same time, however, Flanders never once discussed or analyzed Richards' 
own words, from the letter he filed with the Court or from his deposition; i.e., that he had 
left the Company 6-8 weeks prior to being served. See e.g. PL 's Memorandum; (R. 395-
415.) Flanders failed to address this critical fact in any memoranda, although in nearly 
all memoranda she vigorously argued that Richards properly filed the Company's 
"Answer" to HCA's Complaint. Id 
Flanders also failed to make any reasonable inquiry into the facts or the law. By 
tenaciously clinging to an unreasonable position, she abused the judicial process and 
violated Rule 11. Consequently, sanctions must be imposed against Flanders. 
c. Flanders violated Rule 11 because she failed to make any reasonable 
inquiry of existing law and failed to argue for an extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law in numerous memoranda when she wrongly 
asserted as fact and law that (1) a corporation has a duty to notify the State 
of Utah of changes in its officers and directors; (2) Utah Law allows service 
on a director; and (3) by definition a director is an officer and a managing 
agent. 
1. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of 
existing law, that a corporation, including a dissolved corporation, has 
a duty to immediately notify the State of Utah of changes in its officers 
and directors, other than annually. 
In several memoranda, Flanders stated as a "Material Fact" that: 
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Under Utah law, a corporation is required to register with the State 
of Utah and to maintain a current accurate statement of some of the 
directors and officers of a corporation. The records of the State of Utah 
demonstrate that, at all times material hereto, including at present, Troy 
A. Richards is and was listed as a director of Wheel Cover. 
PL 's Resp. to Mot for Clarification and Reconsideration, dated March 
11, 1996, at 3 17, (R. 1305.); PL 's Resp. to Pet for Extraord Relief 
dated March 7, 1996, at 17 If 5, (R. 1361.); PL 's Resp, dated November 
29, 1995, at 2, 8, (R. 647, 653.); PL 's Resp, dated November 2, 1995, at 
2 K 5. (R. 396.) 
Flanders substantially and materially relied on the above "statement of fact,"8 or 
conclusion of law, throughout each of her arguments. However, not once did Flanders 
cite any rule, statute, or case law to support her theory of the law regarding a 
corporation's duty to "maintain a current, accurate statement of some of the directors and 
officers of a corporation." Id. The conclusion of law, or statement of fact, however 
characterized, is fundamentally wrong and lacks any legal support. See Danielson9 
Letter, dated March 15, 1996. See Addendum 6. (R. 1560.) 
Further, Ms. Flanders failed to analyze or discuss the facially obvious facts in the 
Company's Articles of Dissolution. That one-page document clearly classifies Richards 
as belonging to a group of shareholders that is separate and apart from the group of 
shareholders comprising the Board of Directors. See Addendum 1. Flanders stated with 
8Quotes are used here because Flanders placed the paragraph quoted above in the Statement of Facts 
section of her memoranda. 
9
 George Danielsen was at the time Division Counsel for the Division of Corporations. He 
wrote a letter to the Company's counsel, Jensen, in which he clearly stated that a corporation has no duty to 
keep the Division informed of changes in officers and directors. He also stated that each succeeding report 
filed with the Division superseded the prior filings, including Articles of Dissolution. 
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precision the dates and contents of specific Annual Reports of the Company on file with 
the Division of Corporations. See PL }s Resp., dated November 29, 1995, at 9-10 fflf 37-
39. (R. 654-55.) Yet, she completely ignored any mention or discussion of the 
Company's Articles of Dissolution, which is the most recent document filed. Once the 
Company filed its Articles of Dissolution, it had "no further duty...to notify the Division 
of Corporations of any changes in its officers or directors." Addendum 6. Moreover, 
Flanders cited no authority for her theory of corporate law or her theory of service of 
process on corporations. In essence, Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry of 
the statutes or case law on this material issue and which issue was the sole basis for her 
contention that Richards was remained a director of the Company. (R. 655.) 
2. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of 
existing law, that Utah Law allows service on a director. 
Flanders unreasonably and persistently argued that since Richards was a director, 
service on the Company could be effectuated by service on Richards. See e.g., PL 's 
Resp., dated March 11, 1996, at 22; (R. 1324, 1327-28.) PL 's Resp., dated March 7, 
1996, at 33 (R. 1377.) However, Flanders failed to cite a single statute, rule, or case as 
authority for her view of the law. Flanders also failed to make a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Flanders clearly violated Rule 11 and sanctions 
must be imposed against her. 
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3. Flanders repeatedly argued, without any reasonable inquiry of 
existing law, that by "definition, a director is an officer, a managing or 
general agent and is an agent of the corporation for purposes of 
service of process," 
Without citing to any authority, Flanders repeatedly asserted as fact or law that "by 
definition, a director is an officer, managing or general agent and is an agent of the 
corporation for purpose of service of process." See e.g., PI 's Resp., dated 
March 11, 1996, at 25; (R. 1327.) PI. 's Resp, dated March 7, 1996, at 34; (R. 1378.) 
Pis' Resp., dated November 2, 1995, at 17. (R. 411.) There is no basis in fact or law that 
such definition exists. This was a material assertion in supporting Flanders' arguments 
that service on the Company was effective because Richards was a director. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Richards was no longer a director of the Company at the 
time he was served, Flanders insisted that he was still a director in fact because he 
continued to be listed as a director in the records of the Division of Corporations; and 
therefore he could be served as an agent of the Company. See id. 
Flanders most obviously violated Rule 11 numerous time and sanctions must be 
imposed against her. 
The strenuous defense by Flanders on the issue of whether Richards was a proper 
person to accept service for the Company is most bizarre and irrational at best. Since a 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5), "insufficiency of service of process," is without 
prejudice, Flanders knows that HCA could merely refile its Complaint and begin afresh. 
Flanders should have realized that this was a frivolous fight and that her unreasonable 
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defense of this issue only served to waste the court's resources, cause undue delay, and 
cause unnecessary expenses to her client, to the Company, to Don and to the trial court.10 
Again, Flanders violated Rule 11 because she failed to make any reasonable inquiry 
into the law or facts. Accordingly, sanctions must be imposed against her. 
d. Flanders violated Rule 11 when she stated as fact, in several memoranda to 
the court and in letters to Counsel for the Defendants that a Certificate of 
Finalization for Richards9 deposition was in the court's file, and failed to 
make a reasonable inquiry of the court's file or docket. 
On November 14, 1995, Jensen began requesting information from Flanders that 
would permit him to obtain a copy of Richards' deposition, which Flanders conducted in 
February 1995. The central issue of this case was whether Richards was a proper person 
to accept service for the Company. Therefore, his deposition potentially contained 
material facts. However, Flanders never responded to Jensen's first request for the 
reporter's identity made in November, 1995. See Addendum 5 at 1. He renewed his 
request in subsequent letters, but Flanders repeatedly failed to provide the necessary 
information by insisting that such information was available to Jensen in the court's file, 
when in fact it was not available and never had been available. See Addendum 5 at 12. 
For example, in a letter from Flanders dated January 18, 1996, she states: 
10At first blush, one might say the same about the Company and Don. However, prior to October 
1995, Don was a pro se defendant and the Company had not been served. On January 5, 1996, Judge 
Frederick acted sua sponte in entering a default judgment against the Company and awarding attorney's fees 
in the amount of $13,000 to Flanders, even though Flanders never submitted an affidavit for such fees. 
(R. 871-76.) Instead of filing an appeal on Judge Frederick's ruling, which was obviously in error, the 
Company and Don pursued the less costly path of seeking a dismissal based on insufficiency of service of 
process. 
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Finally, you claim that you have not received information regarding the 
identity of the court reporter that transcribed Mr. Troy A. Richards' 
deposition. This is a bold misrepresentation. You have received this 
information on at least three occasions. On or about June 2L 1995, the 
court reporter filed with the Court a Certification of Finalization of the 
original deposition transcript of Troy A. Richards. This certificate 
reflects the name of the court reporter, the name of the court reporting 
company, address and the telephone number. If you desired, vou could 
have obtained this information. It is not mv fault that vou have been 
remiss in your obligations as an attorney to your client. 
See Letter from Flanders dated January 18, 1996 (emphasis added). 
Addendum 5 at 12. (R. 965-66.) 
Since Flanders repeatedly refused to provide the information requested, the 
Defendants filed on January 22, 1996, a Motion to Compel. It was granted by the court 
on February 22, 1996. (R. 1254.) The Defendants' Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Compel expressly addressed Flanders' incorrect assertion that the "Certificate" 
was on file with the trial court. 
Third, Flanders continually provides false, incorrect, or misleading 
information. In her letter dated January 18, 1996, she claims that 
"on or about June 21, 1995, the court reporter filed with the 
Court a Certification of Finalization of the original deposition 
transcript of Troy A. Richards." 
See Flanders Letter, dated January 18, 1996. 
If such a document is filed with the Court, the Defendants cannot 
locate it. Moreover, the Clerk of the Court cannot find it. No such 
document is listed in the Court's Docket for this case. Again, Flanders 
provided information that is neither correct nor helpful, yet she chastises 
the Defendants' Counsel for being "remiss." 
See Def. 's Mem. in Supp., dated January 22, 1996, at 8. (R. 949.) 
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In HCA's Response, filed on February 5, 1996, Flanders again insisted that the 
"Certificate" was available in the court's file: 
This is a bold misrepresentation. Don has received this information on at 
least three occasions. On or about June 21, 1995, the court reporter filed 
with the Court a Certification of Finalization of the original deposition 
transcript of Troy A. Richards. HCA received this certification in June, 
1995. This certificate reflects the name of the court reporter, the name of 
the court reporting company, address and the telephone number. If Don 
desired, he could have obtained this information. 
See PL fs Resp., dated February 5, 1996 at 3. (R. 1158.) 
The "Certificate" was never in the court's file nor was it ever listed in the docket. 
Despite the express, unambiguous allegation in the Defendants' Memorandum that 
Flanders was wrong and that the "Certificate" was not within the court's file, Flanders 
completely ignored the Defendants' challenge. Rather, she perpetuated her incorrect 
assertion that the "Certificate" was on file with the court. Flanders made no reasonable 
inquiry of the court's files. A simple inquiry of the court's docket for this case would 
have revealed to her that no such "Certificate" was on file. A simple telephone call to the 
Clerk of the court asking for an inspection of the court's file would likewise have 
revealed to Flanders that no such "Certificate" was on file. 
Since Flanders was so insistent on this issue, Jensen asked the Clerk of the court by 
telephone whether the Certificate was in the court's file. The Clerk could not find it. 
Jensen then visited the court to personally inspect the file and the docket to determine if 
the Certificate was perhaps misfiled and was somehow omitted from the docket. He also 
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inquired of the Clerk of the court to determine if such "Certificates" could be filed 
elsewhere. All such inquiries failed to produce any evidence that the "Certificate" was 
ever within the court's custody. Yet, Flanders wasted the court's resources and caused 
undue delay and expense to the Defendants in obtaining the deposition of Richards, 
simply because she refused to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts, in direct violation 
of Rule 11. 
This bizarre behavior is also evidence that Flanders distrusts other attorneys while 
believing in her own infallibility. There are several examples the Defendants could cite 
to illustrate this point, but in the interest of economy of words, they are excluded. 
However, one example is noteworthy. 
During Jensen's efforts to obtain information about Richards' deposition, Flanders 
provided an incorrect name for the court reporter. See Addendum 5 at 5. When Jensen 
informed her that the name she had provided was not listed in the telephone directory 
(she would not provide the telephone number), she brushed that assertion aside and 
refused to correct her error. See Addendum 5 at 12. Only in HCA's Response to the 
Defendants' Motion to Compel did Flanders finally admit that the name she had provided 
was incorrect. See PL 's Resp., dated February 5, 1996, at 4. (R. 1159.) However, 
instead of being apologetic, Flanders stated that "Michael is or should be aware of this 
[error], however, he is wasting the Court's resources arguing over semantics." Id 
The use of t^e word "semantics" was obviously inappropriate. It was not the 
meaning of the name that was at issue but the actual name so that Mr. Jensen could locate 
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the telephone number. Flanders could have easily provided the telephone number as 
requested, but she refused to do so. Jensen had never heard of the court reporter's name 
prior to this time, and Flanders had no basis to assert that he "is or should be aware" of 
the correct name. Her actions underscore her callous disregard for other attorneys and 
her refusal to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts. 
Most importantly, Richards' deposition proved to be of material importance. It 
provided for the first time definitive evidence from a source other than Don that Richards 
departed the Company in early August 1994; that he began employment with a 
competitor of the Company; that he was never an officer of the Company; that he never 
attended any meetings of the officers or directors of the Company; and that he never held 
himself out to be an officer or director of the Company. (R. 1556-57.) His deposition 
also proves that Flanders knew of this information and failed to divulge it to the court at 
the very instant that she was quoting from selected parts of the deposition to show that 
Richards had provided a one-page letter to the Court, allegedly as the Company's 
"Answer." Since Flanders had refused to provide copies of the relevant pages from 
Richards' deposition11 and also refused to provide sufficient information for Jensen to 
obtain a copy of it, he suspected that she was intentionally and deceptively hiding 
11
 Flanders first quoted from Richards' deposition in her memorandum, dated November 2, 
1995, to oppose the Company s motion to strike Richards' one-page letter as the Company's "Answer." (R. 
400,402,408.) Flanders failed to attach copies of cited pages. Not until March 11, 1996, did Flanders 
finally attached any pages from Richards' deposition. 
- 3 6 -
material facts from the court and the Defendants. In December, 1995, Jensen expressed 
his suspicion in a memorandum: 
Plaintiff purportedly deposed Richards, but Plaintiff has consistently 
withheld that deposition from this Court and from the Defendants despite 
efforts by Counsel for Defendants to obtain the deposition or in the 
alternative to obtain the name of the Reporter from whom a copy can be 
obtained. Plaintiffs withholding of such deposition is suspicious because 
it [the deposition] should offer evidence on the issue of whether Richards 
considers himself a Director of the Company. A reasonable and prudent 
deposition of Richards should have included questions about Richards' 
Director status with the Company. Plaintiffs silence on this issue has 
been less than forthcoming. 
See Def 's Reply Mem., dated December 4, 1995, at 10 (emphasis added). 
(R. 701.) 
Jensen's statement above was truly prophetic. A few days prior to his statement, 
Flanders disingenuously assailed the credibility of Don's testimony about Richards' 
departure from the Company. See PL 's Resp., dated November 29, 1995, at 10. (R. 655.) 
While Flanders was attacking Don's credibility on this issue, she possessed sufficient 
knowledge that Richards' deposition fully corroborated Don's Affidavit on the issue of 
when Richards' departed the Company. Withholding this information was an abuse of 
the judicial process and in violation of Rule 11. Therefore, sanctions must be imposed 
against Flanders. 
-37-
e. Flanders violated Rule 11 many times by wrongly asserting that the court 
had made findings or determinations, and she failed to cite to the Record 
because the court had made no such findings or determinations. 
1. Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court 
had determined that the Company was sufficiently served and that 
Richards was a proper agent to accept service for the Company. 
In numerous memoranda, Flanders vigorously defended against the Defendants' 
motions by repeatedly asserting that the court had previously determined that Richards 
was a proper agent to accept service for the Company. See e.g., PL 's Resp., dated March 
11, 1996, at 18, 36-37; (R. 1320, 1338-39.) PL 's Resp to Petition, dated March 7, 1996, 
at 29-30; (R. 1373-74.) PL 's Mem. in Support, dated January 26, 1996, at 8; (R. 990.) 
PL 's Resp., dated November 29, 1995, at 16-17. (R. 661-62.) Flanders failed in every 
instance to cite to any part of the Record to support her assertion. Id 
Flanders abused the judicial process by repeatedly asserting that the court had made 
findings or determinations on this issue when it was never decided by the court until 
Judge Peuler entered her Minute Entry dated April 23, 1996. (R. 1605-08.) Judge 
Peuler's Minute Entry did not overturn or reverse any prior rulings. It was the first ruling 
on the issue. Prior to Judge Peuler's ruling on April 23, 1996, the trial court had never 
made any findings nor articulated its reasoning, its understanding of the facts, or any 
conclusions of law on the issue of whether Richards was a proper person to accept 
service for the Company. Moreover, it is important to note that the only findings in the 
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Record, on the issue of whether Richards was a proper person for service, directly 
controverts Flanders' erroneous assertion. 
Flanders violated Rule 11 by repeatedly asserting that the court had made findings 
when in fact it had not done so. These material assertions caused undue delays and 
substantially increased the costs of this litigation. As a result, sanctions must be imposed 
against Flanders. 
2. Flanders wrongly asserted, without citing to the Record, that the court 
had determined that Don's Amended Answer and Counterclaim was 
frivolous or non-meritorious. 
It is well settled in Utah that a grant of attorney's fees is permitted by contract, by 
statute, or rule. In addition to Rule 11, discussed above, Utah provides for a possible 
statutory basis for the award of attorney fees: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith . . . 
§78-27-56, U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
The number of minute entries and orders in this case is not extensive. In particular, 
the Court's Minute Entry dated October 4, 1995 was brief and void of any findings of 
fact or conclusions of law: 
"Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Amended Counterclaim of Defendant 
Don Jensen is granted for the reasons specified in the supporting 
Memoranda." 
See Minute Entry, dated October 4, 1995. (R. 344.) 
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From this terse Minute Entry, it is clear that Judge Frederick failed to make any findings 
that the Company's actions were without merit or that the Company failed to act in good 
faith. See §78-27-56, U.C.A.; Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.; see also Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) ("trial court must make specific findings 
with regard to each element of the statute"). Further, Judge Frederick failed to articulate 
whether he was imposing sanctions pursuant to §78-27-56, U.C.A., or Rule 11, 
Utah R. Civ. P. 
Judge Frederick's failure to cite any authority for imposing sanctions is fatal since 
the trial court is obligated to make its authority clear and make appropriate findings. See 
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating, Co., 909 P.2d 
225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citing Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (court 
reversed and remanded the award of sanctions because it found it "impossible" to 
determine whether the imposition of sanctions was proper as a matter of law and, if the 
sanctions were imposed for a violation of Rule 11, whether the district court abused its 
discretion in formulating the type and amount of the sanction)) (emphasis added). 
Somehow, however, Flanders determined that she, and she alone, could read Judge 
Frederick's mind, and that she could therefore proclaim to the court that his cryptic 
Minute Entry made determinations that: 
(1) Don's pleadings were "non-meritorious." See PI. 's Resp. dated 
March 11, 1996 at 10. (R. 1310.) 
(2) Don's opposition was "frivolous." See PI. 's Resp. to Petition, dated 
March 7, 1996, at 44. (R. 1388.) 
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(3) Don's pleadings were "non-meritorious." See Pis' Resp, dated 
January 26, 1996 at 3. (R. 985.) 
(4) Don's defenses were "non-meritorious". See PL 'a Resp., dated 
November 29, 1995, at 14. (R. 659.) 
In every instance above, Flanders argues that since the court had already made 
findings, the law of the case doctrine prevents the court's review of the court's own 
rulings. Yet, Flanders never cited to the Record to show where the court had made 
findings or determined the issue of whether Don's actions were lacking in merit or put 
forth in bad faith. 
Flanders repeatedly violated Rule 11 by failing to make any reasonable inquiry into 
the facts, in this case the Record, and the law. Accordingly, sanctions must be imposed 
against Flanders for her violations. 
III. The trial court erred by denying costs, pursuant to Rule 54(d), to the Company 
and Don following the court's granting their Motion to Dismiss, and in doing so, 
the trial court also failed to make any findings on whether the Company's costs 
were taxable costs. 
Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P., requires costs to be awarded to the prevailing party as a 
matter of law: 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; 
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause.... 
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Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs to mean "those fees which are required 
to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be 
included in the judgment." See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
HCA initiated the instant action. Don and the Company responded reasonably and 
appropriately, and they minimized their costs. The trial court, however, required Don to 
pay fees to file his compulsory counterclaim and to demand a trial by jury. It was 
necessary for him to pay these fees in order to preserve the Company's counterclaim12 
and the right to a trial by jury. 
When the case was finally dismissed, the fees previously paid to the trial court were 
not refunded nor were those fees transferable to the identical case filed again by HCA.13 
It is manifestly unjust to require the Company and Don to pay the same fees twice simply 
because HCA and Flanders failed to properly serve its action in the first place. HCA has 
only itself to blame for its failure. 
12Don's counterclaim was properly filed as a derivative action which belonged to the Company. 
13
 The Plaintiff filed the same action against the same defendants on June 7, 1996, filed as Case 
No. 960903093. The Plaintiff did not even wait for the Court's Final Order to be signed. 
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a. The Court's filing fee for a jury demand is mandatory, and the Company 
and Don have a fundamental right to a trial by jury. 
It is immaterial whether a jury was used in this action. Perhaps it is unfortunate that 
the trial court does not refund the jury fee when a jury is not used. However, pursuant to 
Rule 38, Utah R. Civ. P., the Company and Don were required to make their jury demand 
"not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading." Thus, this fundamental 
right would have been lost if it had not been demanded in a timely manner and with fee 
paid. 
Again, HCA filed a duplicate action against the Company and Don even before the 
Final Order was signed. Thus, Don and the Company were put in the unjust position of 
being required to again pay to the court the same fees they paid in the prior case. Had 
HCA properly commenced its action, the Company and Don would have avoided 
duplicate costs. Again, the Plaintiff has only itself to blame. 
b. Since HCA extensively relied on the deposition of Richards in an attempt to 
justify its service of process, the Company sought a copy of his deposition in 
an effort to rebut HCA's argument. 
Utah's Supreme Court has specifically ruled that costs of depositions are not 
recoverable unless "the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good faith and, in 
the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and 
presentation of the case." See Morgan 795 P.2d at 687 (citing Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
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P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980)) (holding that depositions need only be "reasonably 
necessary"). 
In the instant case, HCA, through Flanders, repeatedly and consistently relied on 
Richards' deposition in an attempt to persuade the court that Richards was a proper 
person to accept service for the Company. (R. 1375, 1416.) HCA and Flanders also 
intentionally withheld the court reporter's identity from Jensen.14 Jensen only obtained a 
copy of Richards' deposition after the Court so ordered. In fact, the deposition was most 
revealing. It clearly showed that Richards had left the Company's employment nearly 
two months before he was served with HCA's Complaint. It also clearly showed that 
Richards was never an officer of the Company nor did he know that he was a director of 
the Company. (R. 1556-57.) 
The Company brought to HCA's and the trial court's attention that Richards' letter 
expressly admitted that he had left the Company's employment nearly two months prior 
to being served. However, HCA consistently ignored this fact and failed to acknowledge 
Richards' statement. The court also failed to acknowledge Richards' own statement. 
Only after the court and HCA had clearly ignored this critical fact and only after HCA 
14
 The use of "intentionally" may be viewed as presumptuous. However, the logical inference 
from the following facts led the Company and Don to confidently assert that Flanders' conduct in withholding 
Richards' deposition was intentional. Flanders expressly and frequently cited to Richards' deposition, 
including reference to specific pages of his deposition. Yet, she failed to attach any copies of Richards' 
deposition or any of the pages she cited until March 11, 1996. The reasons for such omissions appear clear 
when one reads from the pages cited, because Richards' testimony substantiates the fact that (1) Richards left 
the Company weeks prior to being served and (2) that he was never an officer of the Company. Richards also 
admitted that he was unaware that he was listed as a director in the records of the Division of Corporations. 
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had used Richards' deposition as support for its argument that Richards was an officer 
and director of the Company, did the Company obtain a copy of Richards' deposition. 
Had HCA or the trial court addressed this issue, the need for Richards' deposition could 
have been avoided altogether. 
It is unclear from the Court's order whether the court relied on Richards' deposition. 
Addendum 3. (R. 1734-35.) It is clear however, that the Company submitted to the court 
Richards' testimony from his deposition to rebut HCA's argument that Richards was an 
officer and director of the Company when he was served with HCA's Complaint. 
(R. 1566.) Even if the Court did not rely on Richards' deposition in its final analysis, the 
deposition was, at the time and under the circumstances, "reasonably necessary" for the 
"development and presentation of the [Company's] case." See Morgan, 795 P.2d at 687. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Company did not act in good faith in obtaining a 
copy of Richards' deposition. Had HCA not relied on Richards' deposition, the 
Company would not have had any reason to obtain a copy of it. Again, HCA has only 
itself to blame. 
CONCLUSION 
Flanders' flagrant violations of Rule 11 are too numerous to cite all of them. 
Nonetheless, in each instance, Flanders failed to make any reasonable inquiry into the 
law or facts to support her statements of fact or her assertions of law. The trial court 
failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law in denying Rule 11 sanctions 
against Flanders or HCA. However, it is clear that Flanders frequently violated Rule 11. 
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The trial court also erred in not imposing sanctions against Flanders or HCA 
pursuant to Rule 37, when the trial court granted the Company's and Don's motion to 
compel but failed to find that Flanders or HCA were substantially justified in withholding 
the information sought or that an award of sanctions would be unjust. 
The trial court further erred when it failed to tax costs against HCA when HCA's 
Complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of service of process after more than 20 
months of costly proceedings. Again, the trial court failed to make any findings, although 
the Company and Don specifically requested, by motion, the trial court to make such 
findings on their costs. (R. 1764-65.) 
The Company and Don now urge this Court to rule as a matter of law that Flanders 
violated Rule 11 numerous times, that the trial court erred by not imposing sanctions 
against Flanders or HCA pursuant to Rule 37, and that the trial court erred by not taxing 
the Defendants' costs against HCA. If this Court so rules, these matters should be 
remanded to the trial court to impose sanctions and costs consistent with this Court's 
rulings. 
DATED this 5th day of May 1997. 
Michael A. Jensen, ^scj/(7231) 
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants 
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Tabl 
im O t e l l e U i ULclJLl DKPAKTMKNT OK COMMKRCK 
Division of Corporations & Commcrrml ("ode Articles of Dissolution 
CO W3> I 
RECEIVED 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation 
adopts the following Articles of Dissolution: g£p j L |QOA 
UTD/V.0fC0UP.&C0WM.C00E 
Must be typewritten 
First: This name of the Corporation is: 
Whcol Cover k a r k e t i n ^ , Inc . dl>a Utah Wheebs Covers 
Second: This dissolution was approved by the shareholders. 
A. The number of votes entitled to be cast, by voting group, on the proposal for dissolution 
is: 
Voting Group Number of Votes 
Board of Directors 2*0,000 
Troy jiicriarch J ,000 
Third: 
Fourth: 
B. The total number of votes to be cast for dissolution was: 21 ,C0C 
The totaJ number of votes cast against dissolution was; 00 
OR 
The total number of votes cast for dissolution by each voting group was . 
This number was sufficient for approval. 
This dissolution was authorized by the shareholders on: August 5, 19 9^ 
The address of the Corporation's principal office or other address where service of process 
may be mailed: 
1124- E. 3300 Co. S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 8^106 
Street Address City/State Zip 
Under penaltte^of perjury, I declare that these Articles of Dissolution have been examined by me and 
are, to the best of ray loiQ^dj^ellnd belief, true, correct and complete. 
By: Cy^^ Cf • -Ui,i^^— Title:. ^v-.-'lV':;us 
Dated: ^ e p t . 1, 199^ 
Send forms in duplicate to: 
SPECIAL NOTE: 
Utah law requires corporations 
seeking dissolution to satisfy all 
outstanding state taxes the 
corporation owes. Please inquire 
with the Utah Tax Commission at: 
I (801) 530-4848 jHmby certify that the 4nd approved 
lb tht offlct ' 
State of Utah 
Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code 
160 East 300 South/Box 45801 
otwmtfcfei*** Salt Lake City, Ut.84145-0801 
qivMo. of Corporation, • # < * » * « ( 2 * „ ( f l 0 1 ) 5 3 0 4 8 4 9 
corpsdba/dissolution.3/93 
Extmfntr. 
J-MtxL 
KORLA T. WOODS 
Division Director 
(£/^/ 
Tab 2 
2240 W. 3800 S., Apt. I 307 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
October 10, 1994 
To Whom It May Concern: J(<Cnc 
RESPONSE TO: 
Hub Cap Annie, Inc. 
vs • 
Jim and Don Jensen 
'C'~:vw;s ?-,--.£..
 £RICK 
Civil Case #^43r^O4^0 ° ^ ^ Q \ o ^ ^ ' V \ 
I, Troy Richards, was hired by Don C. Jensen, representing himself 
as the owner of a Hubcap Annie franchise in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on or about March 12, 1993. My employment was for the purpose of 
sales and service of automotive parts, i.e. hubcaps, wheel covers 
and related items. I assumed the company was a legal and licensed 
company doing business in the State of Utah. 
Shortly after hire, I was told by Don C. Jensen that the Hubcap 
Annie name would be terminated and the company would operate under 
a new name, i.e. Utah Wheels and Covers. I was instructed to 
remove decals, labels, etc. containing the Hubcap Annie name, and 
to remove the name from the store front, company vehicles, etc.. 
I had no knowledge of what, if anything, was transpiring between 
Don Jensen and Hubcap Annie, Inc.. 
I left Don and Utah Wheels on or about August 20, 1994 due to poor 
working conditions and his failure to pay wages. 
If I may be of further assistance, please contact me. 
Sincerely, 
T. A. Richards 
A r t\ /• -s 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
720 E. Three Fountains Dr #74 
Murray, UT 84107-5252 
(801)288-9428 
FAX: 288-0708 
Counsel for Defendants 
JUL - 1 13SS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Third District Court Clerk: 535-5 111; In-Court Clerk 535-5678 
HUB CAP ANNIE, INC. 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
DON C.JENSEN, and 
WHEEL COVER MARKETING, INC. 
FINAL ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 940905231 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
Upon consideration of several motions by the Defendants, it hereby is 
ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is Granted without picjudice 
because the Plaintiff attempted to sei've Defendant Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. by 
i'litfuiTuuriy serving Mr. Troy A. Richards, who was not at the time a proper person for 
service as contemplated by Rule 3, Utah II Civ, P., atTtHvTto^a4-tt^vised-thePlaintiff on-
^D October 21, 1994^aHte4ia4m^trestxTO^ thc-DefbrdaiTtxorpGration, and no othei 
Defendant was served within 120 days as required by Rule 3; and it further is 
6*? 
ORDERED, that the Default Judgment entered against Wheel Cover Marketing, 
Inc., dated Januaiy 5, 1996, be vacated because the Plaintiffs Complaint, upon which 
such judgment was predicated, is dismissed and the Defendants' request for attorney's 
fees is denied; and it further is 
ORDERED, that the Judgement entered against Don C. Jensen, dated 
October 23, 1995, is set aside and vacated; and it further is 
ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against Brenda L 
Flanders is denied; and it further is 
ORDERED, that the Defendants' Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, 
in which the Defendants' sought Rule 37 sanctions against Brenda L. Flanders, is denied 
DATED this / day of June, 1996. 
v O f ^ ^ C v csJ&J^ 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third District Court Judge 
don\ordcr 2.tin June 18, 1996 - 2 -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HUB CAP ANNIE, INC., a 
Nevada corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
vsJ 
JAMES R. JENSEN, DON C. 
JENSEN and WHEEL COVER 
MARKETING, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 940905231 
After a review of the pleadings in this matter, the Court 
rules as follows: 
1. The Judgment entered against Don Jensen on October 23, 
1995, is set aside. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is denied. 
3. Defendant's Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration 
is denied. 
Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an Order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated this £g day of May, 1996. 
SANDRA N. PEULER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
720 E. Three Fountains Dr #74 
Murray, UT 84107-5252 
(801)288-9428 
FAX: 288-0708 
Counsel for Defendants 
nun sitrz.z- z 
Third Judicial P'-'rict 
DEC 1 7 1S96 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
240 I vast 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Third District Court Clerk: 535-5HI; In-Court Clerk: 535-5678 
HUB CAP ANNIE, INC. 
Nevada corporation, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
DON C.JENSEN, and 
WHEEL COVER MARKETING, 
Defendants 
INC. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
CIVIL NO. 940905231CV 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Upon reviewing the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and the Plaintiffs 
opposition in the form of a Motion to Tax, and the Defendants' opposition memorandum, 
the Court hereby orders that the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs is denied. 
DATED this H day of December 1996. 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler .*; 
Third District Court Judge { 
'"V 
y 
Tab 5 
MICHAEL A. JKNSKN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
720 Easl Three Fountains Drive #74 • Murray, Utah 84107-5252 • (801) 288-9428 • Pax: 288-070* 
November 14, 1995 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Flanders & Associates 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing & Don C. Jensen 
Civil No. 940905231 
i 
Dear Ms. Flanders: 
Please forward to me the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and dates of all 
persons or institutions you deposed on the above matter. Also, please provide the full 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the respective Reporters for each 
deposition so that I may order copies as appropriate. 
Very truly yours, 
Michacl ArJensen 
Counsel for Don C. Jensen and 
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
MICHAEL A. JENSHN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
7 2 0 East Tliree Founta ins Drive # 7 4 • Murray, Utak 8 4 1 0 7 - 5 2 5 2 • ( 8 0 1 ) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • Fax: 288-0708 
January 4, 1996 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Flanders & Associates 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. ct al 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Ms. Flanders: 
Please be advised that I have conflict with your proposed date to depose my 
client, Don C. Jensen, on January 17, 1996. We will need to reschedule it. I suggest 
the dates of Friday, Febmary 2, 1996 or Monday, February 5, 1996. Please confirm 
which date is better for you. More importantly, however, since our Motion to 
Dismiss is pending before the Court, I request that you wait until the Court rules on 
that motion before conducting any further depositions. 
Also, I have not received a reply to my letter requesting the name, address, and 
telephone number of the Reporter who prepared the transcript of the deposition of 
Mr. Troy Richards. I should appreciate your reply on this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Michael Arfensen 
Counsel for Don C. Jensen and 
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
V \i U • • •? 
MICHAEL A. JKNSHN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
7 2 0 liasl Three Fountain* 1 >i ive / / 7 4 • Murray, Ul.ili 8 H 0 7 - 5 " i 5 ? • (801) 288-9V.IS • ! ; . .x: ' 1 8 8 - 0 7 0 8 
January 8, 1996 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Flanders & Associates 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Ms. Flanders: 
I am in receipt of your Notice of Rescheduled Date of Deposition. However, I 
still have conflicts with any date that week and will not be able to attend aay 
depositions that week. In my letter of January 4th, I suggested two other dates. 
However, I now request your cooperation in holding any further depositions in 
abeyance until (1) we can obtain a copy of the deposition you apparently conducted 
of Mr. Troy Richards; and (2) until the Court rules on our Motion to Dismiss. If you 
will not cooperate with us on this matter, we will be forced to seek a protective order. 
Notwithstanding this request, I renew my request for the third time for the 
name, address, and telephone number of the Reporter who piepared the transcript of 
the deposition of Mr. Troy Richards. I should appreciate your reply on this matter. 
Veiy truly yours, 
Michael ArJensen 
Counsel for Don C. Jensen and 
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
v \J *» *l 
MICHAEL A. JHNSHN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
7 2 0 East Three Fountains Drive # 7 4 • Murray, Utah 8 4 1 0 7 - 5 2 5 2 • ( 8 0 ] ) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • Fax: 2 8 8 - 0 7 0 8 
January 10, 1996 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Flanders & Associates 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Ms. Flanders: 
I am representing Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. Accordingly, all 
communications, including copies of motions, notices, etc., should be sent to my 
attention at the above address. I formally filed a Notice of Appearance with the 
Court on November 14, 1995 and mailed a copy to you. 
I notice that you continue to send copies to Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. in 
C/O of Mr. Troy Richards. That is improper for two basic reasons: 
(1) Mr. Richards is no longer associated with Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc; and 
(2) Even if he were part of the company, I am legal Counsel for Wheel Cover 
Marketing, Inc. and it is a violation of Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
for you to continue to communicate with the company other than through me. 
You are hereby requested to cease all communications with the Defendant, 
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc., except through me, the company's only legal 
representative. 
Very truly yours, 
%idA$f*-
Michael A. Jenserr 
Counsel for Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
CC: Cindy Beverly, Judge Frederick's In-Court Clerk 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
56 East Broadway 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 355-3839 
Telefax (801) 355-6955 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Dena C. Sarandos 
January 10, 1996 
Michael A. Jensen 
720 East Three Fountains Drive #74 
Murray, Utah 84107-5252 
•Re; Hub Cap Annie, Inc.. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Michael: 
I am in receipt of your letter dated January 8, 1996. I am 
not inclined to reschedule the deposition for Don Jensen again. In 
your previous letter, you requested that I reschedule Don's 
deposition. I tried to accommodate you by rescheduling the 
deposition for January 19, 1996. Unless you provide me with a 
compelling and legitimate reason for continuing the deposition, I 
will not do so. In addition, I will file a Motion to Compel and 
for Sanctions against you and your client. Clearly, you and your 
client already have caused excessive delay in this case. 
Finally, you were told previously that Rocky Mountain Court 
Reporters prepared the transcript of the deposition of Troy 
Richards. 
I look forward to hearing from you regarding the deposition of 
Don Jensen. 
3rend& L. Flanderi_ 
cc: Rose U. Bowe "F3randoVs^&. -Asscyc:.iatj 
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FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
56 East Broadway 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 355-3839 
Telefax (801) 355-6955 
Brenda L, Flanders 
Dena C. Sarandos 
January 11, 1996 
Michael A, Jensen 
720 East Three Fountains Drive #74 
Murray, Utah 84107-5252 
-Re; Hub Cap Annie, Inc. , v. Wheel Cover Marketing. Inc. 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Michael: 
I am in receipt of your letter dated January 10, 1996 
regarding your demand that I do not send copies of pleadings to Mr. 
Troy Richards for Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. May I remind you 
that Judge Frederick ruled that Don Jensen cannot pursue claims on 
behalf of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. Accordingly, he cannot 
retain you to do so. Wheel Cover is no longer is a viable party in 
this action. Judge Frederick has executed the default judgment 
against Wheel Cover Marketing Inc. 
You have copied Cindy Beverly, Judge Frederick's clerk, on 
your letter. If you continue to make ex-pvte communications with 
the Judge, I will file a Motion to Strike the Answer filed for Don 
Jensen and will request sanctions against you personally. 
Finally, Judge Frederick ordered your client to pay $1,156.32 
before he would decide any further motions. If your client does 
not remit payment of this amount, I wilJU-P£oceed with a collection 
action against him. S "^\ 
Sincerfe^J-Nc / \ \ 
Brenda I/. FlaniSenk 
Flanders \&^ Associa):e 
cc: Rose U. Bowe — —-. ~z^L— 
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MICHABL A, JENSEN, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
720 East Tkrcc Fountains Drive # 7 4 • Murray, Utali 84107-5252 • (801) 288-9428 • Pax: 288-0708 
FAX LETTER: Original to follow by mail. 
January 15, 1996 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Flanders & Associates 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Ms. Flanders: 
I received on Friday your letter dated January 10, 1996, and on Saturday, I 
received your letter dated January 11, 1996. Your lack of cooperation in this matter 
is disappointing. However, your baseless statements and threats are very disturbing. 
Let me address them in numbered paragraphs so that you can respond appropriately . 
1. In your January 10th letter, you stated that, 
"I tried to accommodate you by rescheduling Don's deposition 
for January 19, 1996." 
Please clarify this statement because I am unaware that you rescheduled the 
deposition to January 19th at my request. My request was for February 2nd or 5th, or 
for postponing any depositions until the Court rules on the issue of jurisdiction. 
2. Also, in your letter of January 10th, you claim that you previously informed 
me of the reporter's identity for Mr. Richards' deposition. I have never received such 
information. Please identify the form and date of the communication in which that 
information was conveyed. Further, there is no listing in the Salt Lake City telephone 
directory for a "Rocky Mountain Court Reporters." Please clarify and please respond 
with all the information that I have repeatedly requested: name, address, telephone 
number, and date of deposition. 
ii it \i •> ii W 
Brenda L. Flanders 
January 15, 1996 
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3. Since I had not received a response from you, I filed and served a motion for 
protective order last Friday, January 12, 1996. As you are well aware, sanctions are 
inappropriate under Rule 37(d) upon our application for relief under a protective 
order. Accordingly, if you seek sanctions against us, we will seek Rule 11 sanctions 
against you. 
4. Again, in your January 10th letter you allege that my client and I "already 
have caused excessive delay in this case." This may be your assessment but the facts 
speak otherwise. First, your insistence that the letter filed with the Court by Mr. 
Richards was a legitimate "answer" was without merit since any unsigned pleading 
must be stricken under Rule 11 and the Court obviously agreed. Your continued 
defense of that untenable position caused excessive delays in this case. 
Second, you continue to stubbornly cling to the notion that Mr. Richards is a 
director of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. That is an absurd position. You have 
proffered no evidence. More importantly, you completely ignored Mr. Richards' 
own statement that he left the Company "on or about August 20, 1994." You also 
completely ignored the Company's Articles of Dissolution. And, you falsely claimed 
that Utah law requires a dissolved corporation to keep the State informed of changes 
in its officers and directors. There is no such law or regulation and you know it. 
Again, your baseless assertions have caused excessive delays in this case. 
5. In your letter of January 11th, you again make threats of sanctions: 
"You have copied Cindy Beverly, JudgeTrederick's clerk, on 
your letter. If you continue to make ex-parte communications 
with the Judge, I will file a Motion to Strike the Answer filed 
for Don Jensen and will request sanctions against you 
personally." 
Perhaps you misapprehend the meaning of "ex parte"; it means "one sided." Can 
you identify any communication in this instance which is one-sided? Such threats are 
without proper legal foundation when you incorrectly state the facts. 
6. Also, in your letter of January 11th, you assert another nonexistent fact: 
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"May I remind you that Judge Frederick ruled that Don Jensen 
cannot pursue claims on behalf of Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
Accordingly, he cannot retain you to do so. Wheel Cover is no 
longer a viable party in this action." 
Please identify which of Judge Frederick's rulings prohibits my representation of 
Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. And if I cannot represent the Company, who can? Arc 
you asserting that the Company is not entitled to legal representation? Also, you 
appear to be asserting that the Company has no right of appeal and that the default 
judgment is final. If that is your contention, then will you oppose a motion for 
certification on that judgment? If you do not agree that I am the legal representative 
of the Company and follow Rule 4.2 of Utah's Professional Code of Conduct, I will 
be forced to establish that recognition by appropriate action with the Court. 
Finally, please understand that my clients and I are prepared to use eveiy 
avenue available to us throughout these proceedings to defeat your baseless 
assertions. We are confident that we will prevail on all the issues that we have raised 
so far. Judge Frederick is tragically in error on this matter so far but that will be 
reversed in the near future. 
Very truly yours, 
%idA^f^ 
Michael A. Jensefr 
Counsel for Wheel Cover Marketing and 
Don C. Jensen 
MlCHAHL A. JENSEN, ATTORNEY AT LAV 
7 2 0 East Tliree Fountains Drive # 7 4 • Murray, Utak 8 4 1 0 7 - 5 2 5 2 • (801) 2 8 8 - 9 4 2 8 • Pax: 2 8 8 - 0 7 0 8 
FAX LETTER: Original to follow by mail. 
January 18, 1996 
Brenda L. Flanders 
Flanders & Associates 
56 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Hub Cap Annie, Inc. v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. et al 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Ms. Flanders: 
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of today. 
My client, Don C. Jensen, will not be at the deposition you scheduled for 
Friday, January 19, 1996. As I have repeatedly told you, I have a conflict and have 
suggested two alternative dates, both of which you ignored. More importantly, 
however, my clients should not be subjected to depositions until the Court rules on 
our motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. 
Since you have been notified that we will not be present, you are expected to 
mitigate any damages. Therefore, your threat to "have the reporter present" 
tomorrow and to attempt to collect those costs is reprehensible. 
With a new judge, we expect that a hearing will be held in the near future and 
that this entire matter will be properly and fairly resolved. In the meanwhile, 
postponing depositions, other discoveiy, and collection attempts on judgments should 
be held in abeyance. Your cooperation will be appreciated. 
Finally, you continue to deny us the information regarding Mr. Richards' 
deposition. You claim that you gave me the information in a telephone call on 
November 13, 1995. Please provide some verification of that allegation since I have 
no record of it. More to the point, however, why do insist on denying us that basic 
information? Your lack of cooperation on this matter is beyond belief and far beyond 
the civility required by our Professional Code of Conduct. Why you cannot simply 
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send a letter or a fax with the information which we have requested numerous times 
(name, address, telephone, and date of deposition) is incomprehensible. Instead of 
arguing that we should be able to have the information, why do you not simply send 
it once and for all? It would save a lot of time and contention. 
Very truly yours, 
Michael A. JensetK 
Counsel for Wheel Cover Marketing and 
Don C. Jensen 
\) \\ 
a 
FLANDERS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys at Law 
56 East Broadway 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 355-3839 
Telefax (801) 355-6955 
Brcnda L Flanders 
Dena C Sarandos 
January 18, 3 996 
VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
Michael A. Jensen 
720 East Three Fountains Drive #74 
Murray, Utah 84107-5252 
Re: Hub Cap Annie, Inc., v. Wheel Cover Marketing, Inc. 
Civil No. 940905231 
Dear Michael: 
In your letter dated January 15, 1996, you reiterate that you 
have filed a protective order to prevent Don Jensen from testifying 
at his deposition which is scheduled on January 19, 1996. This is 
unacceptable. Rule 26(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
specifically states that "the court in the district where the 
deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires 
to protect a party" from a deposition. You have not obtained such 
an order. Consequently, I expect you to instruct your client to 
attend his deposition that has been scheduled for January 19, 1996. 
If your client does not attend, I will spek sanctions against him 
and you and request an award for the costs" of the deposition. 
You indicate that sanctions are inappropriate under Rule 37(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Your interpretation of this 
rule is incorrect. I suggest you reread the rule and scrutinize 
the language more carefully. 
Finally, you claim that you have not received information 
regarding the identity of the court reporter that transcribed Mr. 
Troy A. Richards1 deposition. This is a bold misrepresentation. 
You have received this information on at least three occasions. On 
or about June 2 , 1995, the court reporter filed with the Court a 
Certification of Finalization of the original deposition transcript 
of Troy A. Richards. This certificate reflects the name of the 
court reporter, the name of the court reporting company, the 
y it o *> i> : > 
address and the telephone number. If you desired, you could have, 
obtained this information. It is not my fault that you have been 
remiss in your obligations as an attorney to your client. In 
addition, I told you the court reporter's company name during a 
conversation we had over the telephone. Also, last week, you were 
sent the name of the court reporter who transcribed the deposition 
of Troy A. Richards. 
It is unfortunate that you do not follow the rules of 
professional responsibility and the rules of civil procedure. I 
hope that you terminate your baseless allegations that the 
information regarding the court reporter has not been divulged to 
you. 
cc: Rose U. Bowe 
Brenda 
FlaTidecs_& 
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Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Douglas C. Borba 
Executive Director 
Korla T. Woods 
Division Director 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South/RO. Box 45801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801 
(801)530-6024 
(801) 530-6438 (FAX) 
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March 15, 1996 
Michael A. Jensen, Attorney-at-law 
First Interstate Plaza, Ninth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655 
RE: Duty of Corporation to report changes in its officers and directors. 
Dear Mr. Jensen: 
In response to the question of whether a corporation has a duty to report to the State of 
Utah any changes in its officers or directors, I offer the following statement: 
Pursuant to §16-10a-302, Utah Code Annotated, a corporation may elect directors and 
appoint officers and agents of the corporation. Pursuant to §16-10a-808, U.C.A., the 
"shareholders of a corporation may remove one or more directors with or without cause unless 
the articles of incorporation provide that directors may be removed only for cause." Pursuant to 
the same §16-10a-808, a "director who is removed pursuant to this section may deliver to the 
division for filing a statement to that effect pursuant to §16-10a-1608." The operative word 
"may" in the preceding sentence is permissive and not mandatory. The Commentary to §16-10a-
1608 reinforces this point by stating that the section allows a person to file such a statement. 
To benefit from the statutes governing corporations, the Division requires that an active 
corporation file an Annual Report each year. This Report requires the listing of current officers 
and directors. As each Annual Report is filed, it supersedes the prior Annual Report. Further, 
changes in officers and directors that occur between the filing of Annual Reports maybe reported 
to the Division as an Amended Annual Report. However, there is no requirement for a 
corporation to file an Amended Annual Report or to report the changes in its officers and 
directors that occur during the time period between Annual Reports. Once again, the 
Commentary to §16-10a-1608 indicates that a corporation may file an amended annual report to 
accomplish the result provided under § 16-1 Oa-1608. 
However, once a corporation files pursuant to §16-10a-1403, U.C.A., Articles of 
Dissolution, the dissolved corporation has no further duty to file an Annual Report or to notify 
the Division of any changes in its officers or directors. In fact, the Commentary to §16-10a-1403 
states that articles of dissolution "is the only filing required for a voluntary dissolution" 
(emphasis added). 
Michael A. Jensen 
March 15, 1996 
page 2 
I hope this has adequately responded to your concerns 
Sincerely, 
George Danielson 
Division Counsel 
Tab 7 
Rule 4 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued 
by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses 
may be signed and served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), 
the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be 
served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint 
unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause 
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the 
action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought 
against two or more defendants on which service has been 
obtained upon one of them within the 120 days or such longer 
period as may be allowed by the court, the other or others may be 
served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of 
the court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the 
action, and the county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to 
the defendant, state the name, address and telephone number of 
the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address 
and telephone number. It shall state the time within which the 
defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall 
notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by 
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either 
that the complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint 
will be filed with the court within ten days of service. If service is 
made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject 
matter and the sum of money or other relief demanded, and that 
the complaint is on file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served 
in this state or any other state or territory of the United States, by 
the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United 
Slates Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other person 
18 years of age or older at the time of service, and not a party to 
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the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs 
(2), (3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or 
the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at 
the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by 
delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an 
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a 
copy to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or 
guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any 
person having the care and control of the infant, or with whom the 
infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed; 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound 
mind or incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a 
copy to the person and to the person's legal representative if one 
has been appointed and in the absence of such representative, to 
the individual, if any, who has care, custody or control of the 
person; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility 
operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by 
delivering a copy to the person who has the care, custody, or 
control of the individual to be served, or to that person's designee 
or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to be served if 
one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver 
the process to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon 
a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject 
to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an 
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the 
agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. If no 
such officer or agent can be found within the state, and the 
defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office 
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or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does 
business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in 
charge of such office or place of business; 
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy 
thereof to the recorder; 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of 
such county; 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a 
copy to the superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to 
the president or secretary of its board; 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are 
authorized to be brought against the state, by delivering a copy to 
the attorney general and any other person or agency required by 
statute to be served; and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon 
any public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by 
delivering a copy to any member of its governing board, or to its 
executive employee or secretary. 
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a 
foreign country shall be made as follows: 
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for 
service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a 
corporation, partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an 
officer or a managing general agent; provided that such service be 
made by a person who is not a party to the action, not a party's 
attorney, and is not less than 18 years of age, or who is designated 
by order of the court or by the foreign court; or 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be 
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to 
be served as ordered by the court. Proof of service in a foreign 
country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for service 
within this state, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order 
of the court. When service is made pursuant to subpart (3) of this 
subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the 
addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee 
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satisfactory to the court. 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the 
person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained 
through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the 
individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, or 
where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be 
served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of 
process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an 
order allowing service by publication, by mail, or by some other 
means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to 
identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the 
individual parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order 
service of process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the 
court, by other means, or by some combination of the above, 
provided that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested 
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably 
possible or practicable. The court's order shall also specify the 
content of the process to be served and the event or events as of 
which service shall be deemed complete. A copy of the court's 
order shall be served upon the defendant with the process 
specified by the court. 
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the 
party serving the process shall file proof of service with the court 
promptly, and in any event within the time during which the 
person served must respond to the process, and proof of service 
must be made within ten days after such service. Failure to file 
proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all 
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule 3(a)(2), the proof of 
service shall be made as follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, United States Marshal, or the 
deputy of any of them, by certificate with a statement as to the 
date, place, and manner of service; 
(2) If served by any other person, by affidavit with a statement as 
to the date, place, and manner of service, together with the 
affiant's age at the time of service; 
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(3) If served by publication, by the affidavit of the publisher or 
printer or that person's designated agent, showing publication, and 
specifying the date of the first and last publications; and an 
affidavit by the clerk of the court of a deposit of a copy of the 
summons and complaint in the United States mail, if such mailing 
shall be required under this rule or by court order; 
(4) If served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of 
the court showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and 
complaint in the United States mail, as may be ordered by the 
court, together with any proof of receipt; 
(5) By the written admission or waiver of service by the person to 
be served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved. 
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms 
as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of 
service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that 
material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the 
party against whom the process issued. 
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a 
copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person 
serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to 
deliver a copy thereof. 
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, 
the person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the 
summons left for the person being served, the date upon which the 
same was served, and shall sign his or her name thereto, and, if an 
officer, add his or her official title. 
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any 
proceeding where summons or other notice is required to be 
published, the court shall, upon the request of the party applying 
for such publication, designate the newspaper and authorize and 
direct that such publication shall be made therein; provided, that 
the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be 
made and shall be published in the English language. 
(Amended effective March 1, 1988; April 1, 1990.) 
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Rule 11 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by 
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his 
individual name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of 
Utah. The attorneys address also shall be stated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or 
other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the 
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the 
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by 
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read 
the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay 
or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, 
or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader 
or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
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Rule 15 
Rule 15, Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading 
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in 
response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, 
unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of 
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may 
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
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(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court 
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, 
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth 
transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since 
the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission 
may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in 
its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental 
pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
Rule 33 
Rule 33. Interrogatories to parties. 
(a) Availability; procedures for use. Any party may serve upon 
any otlier party written interrogatories to be answered by the party 
served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation, a 
partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any 
officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available 
to the party. Interrogatories may, without leave of court, be served 
upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any 
other party with or after service of the summons and complaint 
upon that party. 
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in 
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the 
reasons for objection shall be stated in lieu of an answer. The 
answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the 
objections signed by the attorney making them. The party upon 
whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of 
the answers and objections, if any, within 30 days after the 
service of the interrogatories, except that a defendant may serve 
answers or objections within 45 days after service of the 
summons and complaint upon that defendant. The court may 
allow a shorter or longer time. The party submitting the 
interrogatories may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with 
respect to any objection to or other failure to answer an 
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interrogatory. 
(b) Scope; use at trial. Interrogatories may relate to any matters 
which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers 
may be used to tlie extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence. 
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable 
merely because an answer to the intei rogatory involves an opinion 
or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, 
but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be 
answered until after designated discovery has been completed or 
until a pretrial conference or other later time. 
(c) Option to produce business records. Where the answer to an 
interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business 
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served 
or from an examination, audit, or inspection of such business 
records, including a compilation, abstract, or summary thereof and 
the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially 
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party 
served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify 
the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained 
and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable 
opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect such records and to 
make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries. A 
specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating 
party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served, 
the records from which the answer may be ascertained. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds to Rule 33, F.R.C.P. 
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Rule 37 
Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon 
reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, 
may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may 
be made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters 
relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the 
deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a 
deponent who is not a party shall be made to the court in the 
district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded 
or submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity 
fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a 
party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or 
if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under 
Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the 
discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, 
or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, 
the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the 
examination before he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make 
such protective order as it would have been empowered to make 
on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this 
subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a 
failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the 
court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or 
attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the 
order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
Addendum 7: 10 of 15 
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the 
motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who 
opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing 
the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
making of the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion among the parties and persons in a just mamier. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being 
directed to do so by the court in the district in which the 
deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a 
contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a 
party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, 
including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 
35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), 
the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in 
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for 
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the 
party obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from 
introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
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(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such 
orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this 
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that he is 
unable to produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the 
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the 
attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court 
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the 
genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as 
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the 
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or 
the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses 
incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's 
fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the 
request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the 
admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the 
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he 
might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for 
the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers 
to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party 
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a 
party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take his 
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve 
answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, 
after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, 
after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is 
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pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized 
under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both 
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused 
by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award 
of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be 
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable 
unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective order as 
provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a 
party or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the 
framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by Rule 
26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such 
party or his attorney to pay to any other party the reasonable 
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1,1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule corresponds to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. 
Rule 54 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need 
not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the 
record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
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absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer 
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be 
given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, 
when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate 
rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be 
different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically 
prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall 
be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other 
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than 
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs 
against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within 
five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party 
against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the 
items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and 
file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, 
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within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a 
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at 
the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date 
judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk 
must include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the 
verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if 
the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any 
case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount 
thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make 
a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.) 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4), relating to 
the award of costs by the appellate court and costs in original 
proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed with the 
adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective 
January 1, 1985. See, now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
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